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Abstract
This paper proposes a media studies that foregrounds technological objects as communicative and
historical agents. Specifically, I take the digital computer as a powerful catalyst of crises in
communication theories and certain key features of modernity. Finally, the computer is the motor of
“New Media” which is at once a set of technologies, a historical epoch, and a field of knowledge. As
such the computer shapes “the new” and “the future” as History pushes its origins further in the past
and its convergent quality pushes its future as a predominate medium. As treatment of information
and interface suggest, communication theories observe computers, and technologies generally, for the
mediated languages they either afford or foreclose to us. My project describes the figures information
and interface for the different ways they can be thought of as aspects of communication. I treat
information not as semantic meaning, formal or discursive language, but rather as a physical
organism. Similarly an interface is not a relationship between a screen and a human visual
intelligence, but is instead a reciprocal, affective and physical process of contact. I illustrate that
historically there have been conceptions of information and interface complimentary to mine, fleeting
as they have been in the face of a dominant temporality of mediation. I begin with a theoretically
informed approach to media history, and extend it to a new theory of communication. In doing so I
discuss a model of time common to popular, scientific, and critical conceptions of media technologies
especially in theories of computer technology. This is a predominate model with particular rules of
temporal change and causality for thinking about mediation, and limits the conditions of possibility
for knowledge production about communication. I suggest a new model of time as integral to any
event of observation and analysis, and that human mediation does not exhaust the possibilities within
this temporality.
In attempting to think past a merely human scale of time, my project interfaces with other non-
totalizing, anti-anthropocentric philosophies, but begins from modernist and humanist understandings
of temporality as opposed to subjectivity. Methodologically, my theory of temporality provides a shift
in historical narrative, one that eschews famous inventors, threads of technological or epistemological
progress, or other teleological constructions. Epistemologically, this temporality indicates that
mediation is an event that occurs among various types of organisms of multiple temporalities. This
allows precise interrogation of human notions inflected with time: duration, suspension, desire, fear,
and imagination.
Ethically, scaling time beyond the human gives a novel form of alterity articulated as the different
ways in which we use time to capture the other within theories of communication and history.
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Media Technologies and Theorizing the Nonhuman 
The field of scholarship theorizing the nonhuman continues to increase in scope 
and complexity. Philosophies of species-being conceive of new productivities by 
simple and microscopic life forms and their resulting interactions, symbioses, and 
delimitations of human life. Environmental philosophy shifts the notion of 
interaction to feedback that humans engage in with object-space and resources 
both agents that act and react to one another. This is reflected in new political 
philosophy that, again, concern our interactions with new political actor-networks 
that act upon us1, down to the litter or stem cells that produce our laws and 
policies.2 Finally, new media theory and philosophy of science and technology 
bring interactive technologies, digital information, and virtual place to bear on 
human sensation and subjectivity.  
Whether explicit or implicitly, these philosophies of the nonhuman 
theorize the nonhuman through its communicative capabilities and, as a result, 
indicate that one future for critical communication theory is nonhuman 
communication—providing new methodological, epistemological and ethical 
vantage points of meaningful encounters with otherness. 
It is within the latter group of nonhuman philosophy, of new media and 
science and technology studies (STS) that the communicative link between things, 
namely media technologies, and humans is most prevalent as a foundational 
problematic. In fact, mediation—with and through technological objects—is here 
the fundamental concept as the process defining human experience, 
comprehension, and sociality.  
 
Media histories in human terms 
Historically, mediation has worked through media studies as a quite bodily 
consideration of experience, where the human subjectivity is considered as a body 
more and more removed by technological mediation from traditional, unmediated 
political and social forms of interaction—those that are physical, local, and face to 
face—within the scale of a body’s sensorium. Two epistemological articulations 
of this form of mediation become visible through media histories, one, through 
instrumental and positivist social-scientific approaches, which, concurrent with 
                                                        
1
 Callon, Michel and Bruno Latour, 1981, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathans: how do actors 
macrostructure reality”, in Social Theory and Methodology: toward an integration of micro and 
macro sociologies, ed. K. Knorr and A. Cicourel Advances, London: Routledge. 
2 Bennett, Jane, 2010. Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things. Duke University  
Press. 
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the beginnings of the field of communication research in America at mid century, 
take unproblematically the empirical relationship between psychology and media 
messages or content.  
The second articulation, deriving from European literary and sociological 
traditions, and concurrent with the critical Marxist turn in social science, through 
its approach to history and technological development, showed mass media to be 
a novel form that had corrupted the communicative ability of the print medium, 
and television was specifically theorized as an instrumentalized, illusory 
communication to mass society. The technology itself was pinpointed as an 
apparatus that imaged and materialized the illusory experience of the culture 
industry it served, of stereotypes, and an imagined free American subject.  
Theo Adorno and Max Horkeimer were very specific, adding that a 
technological rationale, “was the rationale of domination itself.”3 In a more recent 
addendum to political economic treatments of mediation, new media or 
computing technologies have, since at least the early 1980’s been theorized as 
marking the shift to late stage post-Fordist or flexibly accumulating capitalism4 
where information is a commodity5, and technologies participate in globalizing 
communicative networks of domination.6 The phenomena of “new media” based 
on the continued ubiquity of computing technologies, is tied to a larger 
postmodernization of time and place by critical theory. A theory of new media 
can be seen, for example, through its perpetuation of a techno-collective 
consciousness: “The intervention of the machine, the mechanization of culture, 
and the mediation of culture by the consciousness Industry are now everywhere 
the case…”7 Or also as a new theory of communication where traditional forms of 
human sociality, political forms, and meaningfulness are supplanted by the figure 
of information. The double mutation of digital information informationalizes and 
molecularizes biological life into DNA while it molecularizes and digitizes 
communication into bits of data.8  What is needed then are new analytic and 
methodological frameworks based on technological change, how media have 
forced a new condition of communication as well as new modes of human life.  
 
                                                        
3
  Hardt, Hanno, 1992, Critical Communication Studies: essays on communication, history, and 
theory in America, New York: Routledge. 109. 
4
 Harvey, David, 2000,The Condition of Postmodernity, Cambridge: Blackwell. 
5
 Mosco, Vincent, 1989, The Pay-Per Society: computers and communication in the information 
age, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Company. 
6
 Negri, Antonio and Michael Hardt, 2000, Empire, Harvard University Press. 
7 Jameson, Fredric, 2005, Postmodernism: or, the cultural logic of late capitalism, Duke 
University Press. 
8 Dillon, Michael and Luis Lobo Guerrero, The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-Being,  
Theory, Culture & Society (2009) 26(1): 1–23. 
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Radical historiography and another time 
On the other hand, radical historiography, as an attempt to push beyond its own 
epistemology, has opened up the possibility of a new style of thought and a 
reconfiguration of how technologies interact with human bodies and what 
mediated communication means to experience. Gilles Deleuze wrote that Michel 
Foucault “used history for the sake of something beyond it.”9 
For what appears to be the present day or the new according to 
Foucault is what Nietzsche called the unseasonable, the 
uncontemporary, the becoming which bifurcates with history, the 
diagnostic which relays analysis with other roads. This is not to 
predict but to be attentive to the unknown.10  
This project takes seriously the continual process of revision and radical revision 
in his historico-epistemological method. While recognizing his close relationship 
to the analytic objects of both the human and the natural sciences, I push 
Foucault’s theory of historiography by removing it from the structures of 
discourse and grounding it in a theory of physical media. As Friedrich Kittler 
observed of Foucault, “the last historian and first archaeologist,” 
It is for this reason that all his analyses end immediately before 
that point in time at which other media penetrated the library's 
stacks. Discourse analysis cannot be applied to sound archives or 
towers of film rolls.11 
It is an opening up of the historical itself to the possibility of producing 
philosophical knowledge beyond historical narrative. The subjective impulse to 
foreground persons of fame and infamy and historical moments correlating to the 
calendar, what Hayden White identifies as “evental histories,” was eschewed in 
radical historiography for the longue duree, or the “deep time” of media 
technologies.12 
Deep time is, perhaps, the most explicit foray into another temporality of 
media based on historiographic perspective.  Siegfried Zielinski contributes this 
term in order to problematize the progress narrative within both political and 
technocratic ideologies, that humanity leads itself and the Earth, through history 
to democratization and diversity of forms of life. Rather than using history to find 
                                                        
9 Deleuze, Gilles, What is a Dispotiff? In Michel Foucault: Philosopher, Edited by  
Timothy Armstrong, New York: Routledge, 1992. 
10  Deleuze, “What is a Dispotiff?” 64 
11 Kittler, Friedrich, 1999, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by with introduction 
by Geoffrey Winthrop Young and Michael Kutz. 
12
 Zielinski, Siegfried, 2006, Deep Time of Media: toward an archaeology of hearing and seeing 
by technical means. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
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“the old in the new” he seeks to unearth the new in the very old and thereby 
showing a “variantology” of media forms and practices in the past that have been 
foreclosed on by the march of human “progress.”13   
However, there is another even more radical philosophical notion of 
media’s time implicit in Zielinski’s concept, and it will be productive to dwell on 
the implications of a deep time of media as that which does not belong to humans. 
Deep time is borrowed from the field of Geological and Paleontological sciences 
which, since the 18th century have created object domains that exist entirely 
outside of human scale of duration. As Zielinski notes, naturalist and geologist 
James Hutton’s “concept of Earth as a cyclic self-renewing machine, without 
beginning or end, is in stark contrast to the time reckoning instituted by 
humans.”14 Beginning with the secularizing or modernizing effect of deep time on 
the anthropocentric chronologies/cosmologies of religious human origins, deep 
time unhinges human time precisely without replacing it with certain mechanical 
and instrumentalist constructions. Human scientific, political, and economic 
constructions from enlightenment and industrialization, either of perfect 
timekeeping, international time zones, or Taylorist efficiency of labor time—
make human time uniform while disconnecting it from “nature.”  
Similarly, deep time does not function to show the alienation or disunity 
of the category of human. Unlike Nietzsche’s philosophical death of God, or 
Freud’s traumatically split psyche, looking to temporality instead bypasses 
another epistemologico-ethical thread of progress, the one that has attempted to 
erase the figure of the human subject, “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of 
the sea.”15  
The figure of nature is extremely important to the current status of media 
technologies as it is determined by a longstanding philosophical dualism of 
human vs. nature. As media theorist David J. Gunkel (2007) has argued, dualistic 
thinking from the modern figure of “reason” in the west and through the critical 
bent of the dialectic, has maintained the most foundational of binaries that shift 
from an epistemological category thought to an ethical category valued. Avital 
Ronnell (1991) claims that technologies and the feminine have historically and 
continue to be evaluated by their conflation and being relegated to the category of 
nature.16 Ian Bogost argues that “human culture is allowed to be multifarious and 
complex, but the natural or material world is only ever permitted to be singular.”17   
                                                        
13
 Zielinski “Deep Time of Media” 7 
14
 Ibid. 5 
15
 Foucault, Michel, 2005, The Order of Things: an archaeology of the human sciences, New 
York: Routledge, 422. 
16
 Ronell, Avital,1991,The Telephone Book: technology, schizophrenia, electric speech, 
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Against this epistemological and ethical grain, deep time does work to 
include human time into its much larger environment of things, that directly being 
the earth, which has existed with life prior to humanity or its perception of time 
before it. And Since the Earth is not the measure or end to deep time, nor is there 
any strict end to deep time, what this temporality invites humanity into is an 
awareness and participation in cosmic time. Deep time as variation in duration 
and life means that human categories cease to make meaning, begin to dissolve all 
together, in a “reentry into a singular existential domain, one no longer broken 
down into crass hemispheres of nature and culture.”18 
The longue duree of media 
Such a radical historical-epistemological break in the study of media can 
be seen seen in the work of Harold Innis, radical in the scope of his working 
through both the deep time and global space of communication, an “attempt to 
model changes of the medial and communicational structures on such a historical 
scale.”19 Innis’ lasting philosophical contribution to media historiography was his 
insight that media technologies express fundamental communicative forms and 
have developed epoch-ally—the distinction between ancient and modern wanes in 
favor of large scale temporal movements of predominate mediums across human 
civilizations. Presaging the archaeological work of Michel Foucault, Innis posits 
that because media technologies express the fundamental register of how humans 
communicate, that the possibility of observation itself, is delimited by its 
particular era of predominate media form, in Foucault’s terms, the media episteme. 
Again, like Foucault, Innis responded that it was the historical form of 
observation that could lessen the effects of the bias in observation that was 
inevitable based on the communication medium it was immersed in. 20  As 
Foucault developed his method based on his notion of the episteme which 
delimited the very conditions of possibility of what could be thought at any 
particular moment, there was still the “historical apriori”, that which indicated the 
foundations of thought. A field could be observed that, 
makes manifest the modes of being of order, can be posited as the 
most fundamental of all: anterior to words, perceptions, and 
gestures, which are then taken to be more or less exact, more or 
less happy, expressions of it … more solid, more archaic, less 
dubious, always more ‘true’ than the theories that attempt to give 
                                                                                                                                                       
University of Nebraska Press. 
17
 Bogost, Ian, 2012, Alien Phenomenology: or what its like to be a thing. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 4. 
18
 Bogost “Alien Phenomenology,” 38 
19
 Winthrop-Young, Geoffrey, 2011, Kittler and the Media, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 144. 
20
 Innis, Harold, 1951, Bias of Communication, Canada: University of Torronto Press.  
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those expressions explicit form, exhaustive application, or 
philosophical foundation.21 
This “region” of the “pure experience of order and its mode of being,” was 
precisely the aim and epistemic capability of the historical in the structuralist 
register of archaeology.  
 Astonishingly, Innis’ historical a priori is not linked to discourse but rather 
to the physicality of media technologies—charted in his analysis through a bias of 
movement either through space or time. In beginning a thread of radical 
historiography Innis also begins a nascent radical theory of communication that is 
not contingent on the actions of human agents or the power of discourse. Key to 
its theorization is that physical technologies mobilize either over great distances 
of geography or great distances of time on earth, and that these material 
mobilizations account for the foundational mediation of human communication, 
which then are productive of political and cultural formations.  
However, the thesis Innis would extrapolate from his historiographic work 
would inherit an all too common feature of western epistemology, a dualistic form 
of thought that begins classification and even naming of phenomena within the 
binary of human vs. nature.  
 
A Historiographic field  
Marshall McLuhan, a young colleague and admirer of Innis, continued to 
diagram media’s deep time, fundamental communicative agency, and, translated 
Innis’ implicit material, and non-discursive historiography into an explicit dictum 
that “the medium is the message.” Behind this seeming hyperbole was the serious 
imperative for an analytic need to conceive of media technologies for their extra-
discursive, and non-hermeneutic powers.  
Crucial to McLuhan’s medium as message construct was its historical 
resonance with new knowledges being produced by a burgeoning medium at the 
same time, computing technology. New communication theories within 
cybernetics and information theory had been deploying similar conceptions as 
seen in founding cybernetician Norbert Weiner’s “organization” or “organism as 
message.” Here neither medium nor organism stand in as metaphors for 
communicative figures such as message, content, or information, but rather are 
identical to them and do the same work. Thus, anthropologist Gregory Bateson’s 
definition that information, not linked to language, is merely a “difference that 
                                                        
21
 Foucault “Order,” xxiii 
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makes a difference.”22 It is no coincidence, given this resonance with scientific 
knowledges at mid century, that McLuhan would coin “new media” as a 
distinction between electronic media and informational media—while writing 
about Innis’ historical innovation in the early 1950’s. 23    Finally, it was 
McLuhan’s innovative historical approach, what he called a “mosaic or field 
approach” to historiography, that most fully expresses a new sense of temporality 
in historical writing.  
Such a mosaic image of numerous data and quotations in evidence 
offers the only practical means of revealing causal operations in 
history. The alternative procedure would be to offer a series of 
views of fixed relationships in pictorial space. Thus the galaxy or 
constellation of events upon which the present study concentrates 
is itself a mosaic of perpetually interacting forms that have 
undergone kaleidoscopic transformation particularly in our own 
time.24  
The purpose of this alternative approach is to attempt in historiographic 
perspective both a synchronic time-slice of “our own time,” as well as an 
exploded-view that, expanding and disjointing our present, shows lines to a 
diachronic, far reaching continuum to the past. We again see affinities with 
Foucault’s route to a “history of the present,” with two important additions. One, 
McLuhan pushed beyond his literary oeuvre (and away as well from what 
Foucault describes in the epoch of literature as literature addressing itself to itself 
as a “writing subjectivity”) into the object domain of technological things used to 
produce and circulate language. Second, and deriving from this epistemological 
push, he took up the models and perceived reality of experimental science. 
It is no accident that for McLuhan a field approach is synonomous with a 
mosaic. As N. Katherine Hayles (1984) commented, there were profound changes 
in the models and metaphors of scientific thought, based on the shifting from the 
observation of a Newtonian physical universe of perfection and identity, to that of 
an Einsteinian relativistic field of chaos and probabilities. The epistemological 
shift revolved around the new precarious position of the observer, the very 
possibility for observing phenomena, in such a universe. In it self-referentiality 
comes, not, as in a modernist universe, from an interiorized intention of self-
knowing or ethical imperative, but, rather, from an exteriority that impinges on 
                                                        
22
 Bateson, Gregory, 1972,  Steps to an Ecology of Mind: selected essays in  
anthropology, evolution, psychiatry, and epistemology. San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co. 
23
 Peters, Benjamin, And lead us not into thinking the new is new: a bibliographic case for new 
media history, New Media Society 2009, 11:13, 13-30 
24
 McLuhan, Marshall, 1962, The Gutenberg Galaxy: the making of typographic man. Canada: 
University of Toronto Press, Preface. 
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the observer. Positioned within a continually transforming constellation of smaller 
patterns—a relationship of whole to parts that is itself always stochastic given the 
physical principle of probabilistic location and identity—the observer is faced 
with two problems from the outside.  
The incompleteness of observation begins in the space that the observer 
occupies herself that can never be seen at all. Changing positionality is not a 
corrective because moving oneself only means changing the pattern one is in and 
beginning observation anew. In this sense, the patterns are constantly in states of 
change since nothing, observer included, can help but move. Though description 
is by and large limited to spatial figures and measurement of object form—Hayles 
crucially keys in, not on the necessary identity of a subject’s new identity within 
this constellation, but on the significance of temporality writ large in this new 
state of affairs. 
As one configuration shifts to another and as “particles” appear or 
disappear in response to the field as a whole, the usual distinction 
between cause and effect breaks down because linear sequences of 
causality depend upon being able to define a one-way interaction 
between the event…but when the interaction is multidirectional—
when every cause is simultaneously an effect…the language of 
cause and effect is inadequate…25  
This opening up of a historical time to a field free of linear cause and effect 
upends two interrelated obsessions based on teleological time: on the most 
contemporary register, analysis and critique of media and technologies, as 
expressed most clearly by the inception of “new media studies” is obsessed with 
the concept of “the new,” as indicated by the search to identify technological 
change and social disruption or crises. The second obsession derives from the 
practice of History as a form of knowledge production that is inherently future 
oriented. The historical field approach gleaned in McLuhan lays bare the 
monolithic proportions of historical time and the unidirectionality that observers 
then internalize in the desire for a vision into the future as the power of historical 
knowledge.  
 Against the grain, McLuhan’s history folds the field of history onto itself 
to provide another vantage point. In this fold is contained the simultaneity of 
present with the past and a momentary, if fleeting de-emphasis on the future of 
media.  
                                                        
25
 Hayles, N. Katherine, 1984, The Cosmic Web: scientific field models and literary strategies in 
the twentieth century, New York: Cornell University Press. 
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 The epistemological-historical opening in McLuhan and its possibility for 
another temporality close up again as he accentuates the primacy of the human 
senses as the starting point for analyzing media, and asserts that technology is 
defined as an appendage, either to physical sense organs on the one hand, or to the 
immaterial organ of the mind in the mediation of thought.26 The emergence of a 
non-teleological, non-anthropocentric time is fleeting compared with the 
repetition and persistence of monolithic historical time in both Innis and 
McLuhan, based seemingly on the same epistemological dualism of human 
(sensorium and body, culture) vs. nature (mediated senses, non-sentient 
technological objects). However, when considering the relationality between the 
human body and its technological prosthetics as an implicit theory of 
communication, we begin to see that the category of the human is constituted by 
basic elements of time, cause and effect and a desire for futurity. The human 
subject is constructed by its sense of temporality just as much as temporality is 
constructed by that subject.  
 
Historical and technoscientific synergies 
 Another step is required in historiographic thought on media technologies 
(as presented above) in order to more fully realize another temporality. In 
thinking through media’s time, one must be able to scale back and forth the scope 
of analysis between the very large and the very small. This is analytic difference 
between micro-histories that can describe the minutia of objects, bodies, and lives, 
versus longue duree that may place them within deep time. Too close to the 
former and historical thought repeats the mistake of marking famous subjects in 
history, too much of the latter and the dynamic processes of the movements, the 
recognition of temporalities beyond the observer, become lost. Hans-Jorg 
Rheinberger argues that the synergy of historiography and the natural sciences, 
leading to the History of Science field, produced a historical epistemology. 
Epistemology is,  
Not a theory of knowledge but rather… following the French practice, 
used for reflecting on the historical conditions under which, and the means 
with which, things are made into objects of knowledge.27 
                                                        
26
 McLuhan, Marshall, 1964, Understanding Media: the extensions of man, New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company. 
27
 Rheinberger, Hans-Jorg. 2010. Historicizing Epistemology: an essay. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2. 
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Likewise the subject of historical knowledge, through historical epistemology is 
problematized and does not resemble a “natural history” but rather “understands 
its own knowledge production as a process of historical change.”28 
Historicization of epistemology thus also means subjecting the 
theory of knowledge to an empirical-historical regime, grasping its 
object as itself historically variable, not based in some 
transcendental presupposition or a priori norm.29  
The upshot of historical epistemology was that historical thought, when 
foregrounding the experimental objects of the sciences, was forced to reflect on 
the affective qualities of those objects, and the part that objects in general play in 
the production of knowledge. The synthesis of historiography as a humanistic 
endeavor, not only with the objects, but with the techniques and knowledge 
production of sciences puts in place the ability to scale between micro and macro 
historical time.  
Articulated to technologies, media history may become a mode of 
technoscientific thought, defined by Don Ihde as “the hybrid output of science 
and technology, now bound inextricably into a compound.”30 The hybrid is for 
Ihde a synthesis of histories, “that of technologies that go back as far as all human 
origins, and that of science,” seen as a modern history.31 A radically historical 
media studies does not merely produce histories of technological objects, but 
participates in a recursion, a reflexive turning in on itself in order to articulate the 
history of media technologies it attempts to know, with a history of the field of 
knowledge itself.  
 
Scaling beyond human timekeeping 
Gilles Deleuze, whose most famous foray into philosophy of 
technology/media was the cautionary tale, a “Postscript to a Control Society”—
expressed another historical opening up of critical thought to the highly technical 
and scientific at a moment when the electronic revolution was giving way to the 
information society. Deleuze borrowed heavily from the observations and figures 
of experimental sciences, seeing complexity/chaos theories, black holes, 
singularities as resonating with his immantist philosophy. Deleuze reconfigured 
                                                        
28 Rheinberger, Hans-Jorg. 1997. Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing 
Proteins in the Test Tube. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2. 
29
 Rheinberger “Historicizing Epistemology,” 3 
30
 Ihde, Don. 2009. Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking University lectures. NY: 
SUNY Press, 41. 
31 Ihde, “Postphenomenology,” 45 
Martinez / Communication, Technology, Temporality
communication+1 Vol. 1 [2012], Iss. 1, Article 5
10
art, science, and philosophy as the three fundamental threads of human creative 
endeavor, all engaged with the figure of chaos. 
What I'm interested in are the relations between the arts, science, 
and philosophy. There's no order of priority among these 
disciplines. Each is creative.32  
Each epistemological thread with distinct objects of knowledge, come into 
“relations of mutual resonance and exchange”33 at moments of emergence of a 
type of material organization with purpose, what Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
theorize as a machinic assemblage.34 Manuel DeLanda would take from this the 
philosophical notion of machinic phylum, “the overall set of self organizing 
processes in the universe,” and reproduce it as a historical figure for describing 
the emergence of highly specific organizations in a given particular moment.35   
The crux of this position is to emphasize, and this is especially because of 
our technological abilities, that humans can scale beyond their bodily senses—to 
the infinitesimally small and the cosmically immense—of all systems. From this 
perspective it is of the utmost importance that molecular sciences, for example, 
have discovered autopoiesis, or self-organizing systems and processes from chaos. 
These microscopic discoveries can tell us much about organization of much larger 
and more complex systems, as matter (what should be the object of all materialist 
concerns) runs the gamut from atoms to galaxies.  
Human civilization is a perfect example of such self-organization, and we 
humans will take this as proof of the exemplary nature of our agency—but a 
certain empirical sensibility shows that humanity is hardly the only or even the 
most unique form of self-organization. DeLanda borrows another of Deleuze’s 
hollistic but non-totalizing concepts that attempt rather to perform within the 
working system that it both names and is a part of. In using the “machinic phylum” 
as reference “to the overall set of self-organizing processes in the universe”,36 De 
Landa imagines an artificial intelligence to be its own historical guide through the 
book that it writes. The robot historian would be privy to non-human factors of 
development and change within systems such as computing technologies “as if” 
                                                        
32
 Deleuze, Gilles, 1990. Negotiations, 1972-1990, Translated by Martin Joughin, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
33
 Deleuze, “Negotiations,” 123 
34
 Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, 1987, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and  
Schizophrenia, Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
35
 DeLanda, Manuel, 1991, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York: Serve, 6  
36
 DeLanda, “War in the Age,” 7 
Martinez / Communication, Technology, Temporality
communication+1 Vol. 1 [2012], Iss. 1, Article 5
11
computers constituted non-organic life.37 In addition, this history-bot would have 
neither inclination nor the programming to privilege its own “kind.”  
This conclusion, that behind self-organization there is a “machinic 
phylum,” . . . would hardly escape the notice of our hypothetical 
robot historian. After all, the emergence of “robot consciousness” 
could have been the result of such a process of self-
organization . . .38 
The theory of communication produced by a radical history, and what is proposed 
in this paper, has three key epistemological features. One, it proposes that 
encounters or interactions take place in scales of time that do not belong strictly to 
human beings. Two, it conceives of the movements of human and nonhuman 
bodies generally through the figure of emergence and self-organization, that is, 
without prior cause or intention of a human subject. As a result, communicative 
encounters with nonhuman agents generally and technological objects specifically 
will show them to have tendencies or purposes beyond human design or intention. 
Three, bodies, organisms, and energies manifesting physically and affectively will 
stand in for symbols, texts, and meaning. It is in this sense that we can begin to 
recognize an empirical nature to History (as the expression of time and objects in 
time as we experience them) while recognizing that there are never historical facts 
that we can prove, collect, or write—only the brute facts of things that affect how 
we produce knowledge.   
Once the nonhuman becomes a primarily communicative problematic, the 
humanist figures of Western knowledge seemingly in crisis: representation, 
correlationism 39 , hermeneutics, and social construction may be assessed as 
fundamental communicative forms that have both an epistemological and 
ontological register. Thinking through media technologies with nonhuman 
purpose and capability is one among numerous forms of knowing that addresses 
the fundamentally ethical nature of nonhuman otherness. While technology as 
subject presents no primacy over other nonhuman subjects, species or animal 
beings, organic non-sentient life, general inorganic objects, for instance—it 
resonates with them all and contributes to a critical mass of pushing 
humanity/humanism into the plentitude of their universe. What becomes visible 
between the seeming extremes of nonhuman agency writ large and the dualistic 
thinking of human tradition, is the in between of ethical other centric stances. 
                                                        
37
 Ibid. 7 
38
 Ibid. 8 
39
 Quentin Meillassoux defines correlationism as any philosophy that presumes that neither mind 
(subject) nor being (object) can be grasped independently of one another. “Consequently, it 
becomes possible to say that every philosophy which disavows naive realism has become a variant 
of correlationism.” (Meillassoux 2008, 5) 
Martinez / Communication, Technology, Temporality
communication+1 Vol. 1 [2012], Iss. 1, Article 5
12
Critical race, Feminist, and queer positions are benefited by the nonhuman push 
and the knowledge that the current sorry state of political and social power 
structures are not corrected by the selection of a revolutionary class, race, gender, 
or sexuality identity. Rather, such structures are stripped bare of their 
foundational epistemological and ethical faults when entered into the last bastion 
of otherness—where even the statement of the most radical democratic theory 
measures little relative to the duration of interacting bodies—the cosmos.  
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